Afenyo-Markin's Continues Criticism Against GoldBod Largely Fueled By Politics - Sammy Gyamfi

Date: 2026-08-23
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WHERE AFENYO-MARKIN GOT IT WRONG: THE FACTS BEHIND THE US$1.7BN GOLDBOD CONTROVERSY THE NEWSMAN’s VERDICT The public debate over Ghana’s gold-purchase programme has been distorted by the conflation of two different financial records. Minority Leader Alexander Afenyo-Markin is correct that the International Monetary Fund identified substantial losses associated with the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme in 2025. He is, however, wrong to present the entire amount as a corporate loss recorded by the Ghana Gold Board. He went even further by predicting “scary” or onerous bail conditions for Sammy Gyamfi and GoldBod’s management, effectively jumping from an accounting dispute to an assumption of criminal liability without any charge, trial or judicial finding. The IMF’s 2026 Selected Issues report states that the significant expansion of the Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme generated losses exceeding US$1.7 billion—about 1.5 per cent of GDP—in 2025. The Fund attributed the amount largely to the Gold-for-Reserves doré-gold operations and identified service and assay fees, discounts granted to private off-takers and, most importantly, exchange-rate differences between the forex-bureau rate used to purchase gold and the Bank of Ghana’s accounting reference rate. The IMF also acknowledged that part of the amount reflected valuation effects rather than direct economic waste, although those effects still weakened the central bank’s balance sheet. Therefore, the US$1.7 billion figure is not imaginary, but its ownership and interpretation matter. GoldBod’s separate audited financial statements tell a different story. They report an operational surplus of approximately GH¢907 million and an overall surplus of about GH¢5.44 billion for 2025, although the larger figure includes roughly GH¢4.55 billion in government-provided revolving capital treated as revenue under public-sector accounting standards. Under the 2025 arrangement, the Bank of Ghana financed the purchases and carried the trading and exchange-rate exposure, while GoldBod operated mainly as the purchasing, aggregation and assaying agent. GoldBod says its combined service and assay fees amounted to only 0.758 per cent and that it neither negotiated the off-take agreements nor determined the final selling prices. The defensible conclusion, therefore, is that the wider Bank of Ghana programme incurred a serious cost to the country, while GoldBod contributed some fees within that structure but did not itself record the entire US$1.7 billion as a corporate loss. What Ghana now needs is a transparent reconciliation of the accounts—not politically convenient accounting. Afenyo-Markin’s warning about future “scary” bail conditions was even more troubling. Bail is determined by a court after a person has been accused of a specific offence; it is not a political punishment to be announced in advance by an opposition leader. No published audit has established that Sammy Gyamfi stole public money, deliberately caused financial loss or committed an offence warranting arrest. Parliament is entitled to summon GoldBod officials, demand the purchase and selling prices, examine the off-taker contracts and question every fee paid. That is constitutional oversight. Predicting imprisonment and oppressive bail conditions before establishing wrongdoing, however, sounds more like political intimidation than responsible accountability. A chronological examination of Afenyo-Markin’s own public controversies should have encouraged greater restraint. In 2015, a leaked recording sparked allegations that a voice believed to be his discussed “legal gymnastics” and payments connected to a court action against ADB’s proposed share flotation; the CID questioned him and granted him GH¢500,000 bail, but he denied the tape’s authenticity and described the episode as blackmail, while ADB subsequently denied paying him any bribe. In March 2024, his remarks about Professor Naana Jane Opoku-Agyemang’s age provoked such uproar that Parliament suspended proceedings, after which he withdrew the age-related comments. In May 2025, he became embroiled in an alleged assault involving a police officer during the “Save the Judiciary” demonstration; he filed a counter-complaint, and the police docket was later sent to the Attorney-General for review, with no conviction established. Then, in March 2026, he withdrew and apologised for fraud allegations against Interior Minister Muntaka Mohammed-Mubarak concerning security-service recruitment. Allegations are not convictions, but the repeated controversies and retractions raise legitimate questions about judgment and political temperament. For the NPP, this style of politics could prove electorally costly. A party seeking to regain power must persuade Ghanaians that it has reflected on its defeat and is prepared to offer a credible, disciplined and evidence-based alternative. When its parliamentary leader substitutes threats, personal attacks and sensational claims for careful scrutiny, undecided voters may conclude that the party remains arrogant, vindictive and unreformed. Afenyo-Markin may believe that aggressive rhetoric energises the NPP base, but it could equally alienate moderate voters and reinforce negative perceptions of the party. If that approach becomes the NPP’s dominant public character, it could make the party increasingly unattractive and prolong its stay in opposition. Ghanaians are entitled to question whether the priorities of the IMF and World Bank always align with Ghana’s sovereign development interests, because lenders naturally emphasise debt sustainability, fiscal discipline and the protection of their resources. It would, however, be inaccurate to state as fact—without evidence—that these institutions fabricated the gold losses to collapse GoldBod and force Ghana back for financial assistance. Indeed, the same IMF report credits the gold programme with formalising US$10.9 billion in artisanal gold exports, rebuilding international reserves and contributing to exchange-rate stability, even while criticising its high costs. The World Bank did not author the US$1.7 billion assessment. Ghana’s best response is therefore neither blind acceptance of foreign prescriptions nor denial of documented costs. True economic sovereignty requires strong local institutions, transparent contracts, independent audits and a GoldBod capable of retaining Ghana’s gold value while reducing the fees, discounts and exchange-rate losses that burden the taxpayer.

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